

























Modern  global  food  supply  chains  are  characterized  by  extremely  high  levels  of 
concentration  in  the middle  of  those  chains.  This  paper  argues  that  such  concentration 
leads  to  excessive  buyer  power, which  harms  the  consumers  and  food  producers  at  the 
ends of  the  supply  chains.  It  also  argues  that  the harms  suffered by  farmers  are  serious 
enough as to constitute violations of the international human right to food, as expressed in 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  more  specifically,  in  the  International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. World competition law regimes cannot 
ignore  these  human  rights  imperatives.  To  a  certain  extent,  these  imperatives  can  be 












Buyer  power  in  food  supply  chains  has  been  an  issue  of  concern  for  agricultural 
policymakers and regulators  the world over  for  the  last  few years.  In 2008, a majority of 
the members of the European Parliament adopted a declaration requesting the European 
Commission  to  address  “the  abuse  of  power  by  large  supermarkets  operating  in  the 
European  Union.”1  Over  the  course  of  the  past  decade,  the  U.S.  Senate  conducted  a 
                                            
*LL.B(Hons)  (King’s  College,  London,  2008),  J.D.  (Columbia,  2008),  B.C.L.  (Oxford,  2010).  Visiting  Scholar, 
Université  Catholique  de  Louvain,  (October  2009  –  December  2010);  Research  Associate  to  the  UN  Special 
Rapporteur  for  the  Right  to  Food.  The  ideas  and  recommendations  contained  in  this  paper  do  not  bind  or 
represent the positions of the Special Rapporteur or of the UN in any way, shape or form. I would like to thank Dr. 
Christine Jesseman for her kind assistance and extremely insightful comments. All mistakes are mine alone. 
     Declaration  tabled  by  Caroline  Lucas  (Verts/ALE/UK),  Gyula  Hegyi  (PSE/HU),  Janusz Wojciechowski 
(UEN/PL),  Harlem  Désir  (PSE/FR)  and  Hélène  Flautre  (Verts/ALE/FR)  pursuant  to  Rule  116  of  the  European 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number of hearings  into concentration  in agricultural markets.2 Moreover, at  the time of 
writing, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Agriculture were holding a 








power  in  food  supply  chains.  Examples  of  such  engagement  by  competition  authorities 
include  the  Groceries  Market  Investigations  of  2000  and  2008  by  the  UK  Competition 
Commission,  and  the  investigation  of  the  alleged  milk  cartel  by  the  South  African 
Competition Commission. The latter milk cartel was investigated for, among other things, 
allegedly  colluding  to  fix  the  purchase  price  of milk,  as well  as  imposing  contracts  upon 
dairy  farmers  requiring  them  to  supply  their  total  milk  production.7  More  recently,  an 
investigation  was  launched  into  the  supermarket  industry,  with  the  Competition 
Commission  specifically  citing  as being of  concern  the exclusion of  small  producers  from 
access to retail shelves as a result of buyer concentration.8 
                                            
Parliament's  Rules  of  Procedure,  EP  reference  number:  DCL‐0088/2007  /  P6‐TA‐PROV(2008)0054.  See, Myriam 
Vander Stichele and Bob Young, The Abuse of Supermarket Buyer Power in the EU Food Retail Sector: Preliminary 
Survey of Evidence, Agribusiness Accountability Initiative (March 2009, Amsterdam). 
2  U.S.  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  Hearing,  Ensuring  Competitive  and  Open  Agricultural  Markets:  Are  Meat 
Packers Abusing Market Power?  Sioux Falls,  South Dakota,  (23 August   2002); U.S.  Senate  Judiciary Committee 










7  Press  Statement,  Milk  Cartel  Hearings  Set,  Competition  Commission  of  South  Africa,  (7  Feb  2008).  The 
investigation has so far remained bogged down on procedural questions, with the Supreme Court of Appeal ruling 
that the Competition Commission’s initiation of the complaint against two of the alleged cartel members, as well 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Apart from these better‐known examples, fair trade and competition authorities in Korea, 
Taiwan  and  Thailand  have  brought  actions  against  dominant  buyers  for  various  kinds  of 
abusive  conduct.  Between  1999  and  2001,  the  Korean  Fair  Trade  Commission  (KFTC) 
prosecuted  Wal‐Mart  and  Carrefour  for  conduct  that  included  unfair  refusal  to  receive 
products, unfair return of products, unfair price reductions, unfair passing on of advertising 
fees  to  producers,  etc.  The  KFTC  imposed  fines  on  both  Wal‐Mart‐Korea  and  Korea‐
Carrefour  and  ordered  both  companies  to  publicize  the  fact  of  their  abusive  conduct  in 
newspapers.9 In Taiwan, a Commission established pursuant to the Fair Trade Law of 1991 
identified  six  types  of  unfair  retailer  practice,  ranging  from  charging  improper  fees  to 





An  important question  is whether  the  legal  response – of which antitrust or competition 
law  undoubtedly  forms  the  major  part  –  should  be  conceived  purely  as  a  matter  of 
choosing  between  good  and  bad  policy  options,  or  whether  human  rights  norms  have 
some  application.  It  is  the  argument  of  this  paper  that  the  international  human  right  to 
food indeed applies. In the next section, I shall describe the structure and design of global 
agricultural  markets  and  food  supply  chains.  In  the  third  section,  I  shall  summarize  the 
international  human  right  to  food,  as  expressed  in  various  international  instruments  as 
well  as  in  constitutional  documents,  and  the  obligations  arising  under  it,  which  will 
demonstrate that the human right to food must  indeed feature in the policy debate over 
buyer  power.  This  means  that  competition  laws  should  ensure  the  protection  of  a 
minimum amount of producer welfare such as would be necessary for producers to have 
access  to  adequate  food.  In  the  fourth,  I  shall  argue  that  the  prevailing  conception  of 
competition  law;  i.e.  as  a  tool  for  the  protection  of  consumers  as  its main  or  even  sole 
priority (the “consumerist approach”) may coincide to a significant extent with such human 
rights  norms.  In  this  vein,  I  shall  set  out  the  arguments  for  why  the  creation  or 
maintenance of dominant buyer power is antithetical to the long‐term (and in some cases 
the  short‐  or  medium‐term)  interests  of  consumers,  particularly  those  in  developed 
countries,  as  well  as  the  arguments  for  why  competition  law  should  control  such 
developments. 
 




10  G.  Lin,  Taiwan’s  Competition  Law  Enforcement  Experience  and  Cases  in  Retailing  Business,  APEC  Training 
Program on Competition Policy paper, 2 – 5. Op. cit. Dodd & Asfaha, supra, note 9, 23 (2003).  
11  Note  submitted  by  Thailand, How  enforcement  against  private  anti‐competitive  practice  has  contributed  to 
economic development, OECD Global Forum on Competition (2004). 
The Right to Food and Buyer Power 2010]                                                          1193 
In  the  fifth  part  of  the  paper,  I  shall  set  out  an  argument  for  why  currently  dominant 
consumerist  approaches  to  competition  law,  are  nevertheless  inadequate.  Instead,  a 
conceptual shift has to be made to a theory of competition control which recognizes the 
importance of protecting and advancing human rights such as  the right  to  food. This  is a 
“shift” to a new theory of competition law, and not a “return” to the ordoliberal theories 





ecumenical  spirit,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  language  used  by  lawyers  from  different 
jurisdictions  varies  considerably.  By  “competition  law”,  I  mean  all  those  bodies  of  law 




treated  similarly:  a  safe  rule of  thumb  for  the  reader would be  to understand  the  terms 





and  principles  of  competition  law  that  may  affect  conduct  of  firms  and  undertakings 
outside  the  jurisdiction.  The need  for  this will  hopefully become evident  as  I  discuss  the 
obligation of “international cooperation”. 
 
Finally,  the  reader  should  be  aware  that  the  U.S.  is  not  a  party  to  the  International 






















about current hunger statistics  is  the  fact  that  the people most  likely  to be going hungry 
are  not  consumers,  but  rather  those who  are  involved  in  the making  and  production  of 
food. According to a survey done by the UN Millennium Project in 2005, farmers cultivating 
small patches of land (“smallholders”) and landless agricultural workers together made up 









everyone.  Indeed,  for  the first  time  in history, obese people now actually outnumber  the 
starving.19  The  fundamental  reason  for  such  perverse  deprivation  in  the  midst  of 
abundance  is  the  widespread  inability  to  buy  food  in  the  market  due  to  insufficient 
incomes.20 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The third astonishing feature of that landscape is the extreme level of concentration in the 
middle  of  global  food  supply  chains.  Consider  the  following  figures.  In  2008,  the World 
Bank estimated that 2.5 billion people around the world farmed for a living.21 To take one 
commodity in particular, those who grew coffee numbered about 25 million. At the other 
end  of  the  chain,  there were  around  500 million  consumers  of  coffee.  However,  at  the 
middle of the chain, we observe that the concentration ratio (i.e. the market share of the 
top  four  firms) of  the  coffee  roasting  industry was 45%,  and  that of  international  coffee 
trading  was  40%.22  The  same  World  Bank  report  states  that  just  three  companies 
controlled  over  80% of  the world’s  tea markets, while  concentration  ratios were  40%  in 
international  trading  in  cocoa,  51%  in  cocoa  grinding,  and  50%  in  confectionary 














levels  of  global  hunger,  because  extreme  buyer  concentration  reduces  the  number  of 
options  available  to  sellers,  i.e.  farmers.  Such  concentration  gives  such  buyers  thereby 
considerable power to set the terms, conditions, and prices in their dealings with farmers, 





24  See,  Peter  Gibbon,  The  Commodity  Question:  New  Thinking  on  Old  Problems,  Human  Development  Report 
Office, Occasional Paper,  2005/13 and Bill Vorley, Food  Inc.:  Corporate Concentration From Farm  to Consumer, 
United  Kingdom  Food  Group,  (2003),  available  at:  http://www.ukfg.org.uk/docs/UKFG‐Foodinc‐Nov03.pdf,  and 
Mary  Hendrickson  et  al.,  The  Global  Food  System  and  Nodes  of  Power  (2008),  available  at  SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337273  (Last  Accessed :  23  November  2010)  and  Molly  Anderson,  A  Question  of 
Governance: To Protect Agribusiness Profits or  the Right  to Food?, Agribusiness Action  Initiatives  (2009) and A. 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thereby  depriving  farmers  of  the  ability  to  earn  enough  income  to  feed  themselves 
adequately. For  instance, studies have shown that the practice of dominant UK groceries 









reduction  in  price.  A  recent  study  by  ActionAid  and  the  South  Centre  demonstrates  a 
positive  correlation  between  concentration  in  coffee  markets  and  the  ever‐decreasing 
proportion  of  the  value  of  the  finished  coffee  product  that  reaches  farmers.26  Coffee  is 





coffee  in  an  attempt  to  earn  income  in  the  short‐term,  thereby  causing  oversupply  and 
depressing  coffee prices  further, even below  the average cost of production.  In essence, 
producer  welfare  is  appropriated  again  and  again  in  a  vicious  circle  ending  only  when 





in  dumping  waste  materials,  or  poor  farmers  may  be  driven  into  making  their  children 
work on the farm: as a result of concentration among buyers in the cocoa market in Cote 
d’Ivoire,  agricultural  wages  were  so  severely  depressed  that  that  there  were  reports  of 
small‐hold cocoa  farmers  resorting  to using child  labor.28 The vast majority of child  labor 
                                            
25 Catherine Dolan & John Humphrey, Changing Governance Patterns  in  the Trade  in Fresh Vegetables between 
Africa and the United Kingdom, GLOBALISATION & POVERTY, 17 – 18 (2004). 
26  Samuel  Asfaha,  Commodities  dependence  and  development:  some  suggestions  on  how  to  tackle  the 
commodities problems, South Centre & ActionAid (2008). 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takes  place  in  agriculture:  70%  of  all  working  children,  or  132  million  boys  and  girls 
between the ages of 5 and 14.29 
 
A  prima  facie  claim  can  therefore  be made  that  buyer  concentration  along  food  supply 
chains  (with  exceptions)30  tends  to  lead  to  buyer  power  in  those  chains,  which  in  turn 
















                                            
29  Website  of  the  International  Programme  on  the  Elimination  of  Child  Labour,  ILO: 
http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Agriculture/lang‐‐en/index.htm  (Last Accessed:  20 November 2010) A  recent  ILO 
document states that an estimated 26.4% of children between the ages of 5 and 14 in Africa are victims of child 
labour,  thus making  it  the  region where  the  “least progress has been made during  the past  years  towards  the 
elimination of child labour.” Moreover, most of these children are employed in agriculture. The report also cites 
the  “persistent  lack  of  basic  and  social  infrastructure  and  adequate  livelihood  for  their  families”  as  the  main 
reasons for the deterioration of the child labour situation in Africa: Action against child labour 2008 – 2009: IPEC 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This basic expression was subsequently developed upon in Article 11 of the ICESCR, which 








contrast  to the right to adequate food, which  is  limited. At the same time, however,  it  is 
clear that the right to be free from hunger and the right to adequate food are  intimately 
linked with one another. Alston argues that the right to be free from hunger is a sub‐norm 
under  a much  broader  right  to  adequate  food;  the  bare minimum  expected  of  a  State, 
which should properly be aiming towards the full realization of the much broader right to 
adequate food.38 On the other hand, a former UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, 
                                            
34  See, Philip Alston,  International  Law and  the Human Right  to Food,  in THE RIGHT  TO FOOD, 32  (Philip Alston & 





take appropriate  steps  to ensure  the  realization of  this  right,  recognizing  to  this effect  the 
essential importance of international co‐operation based on free consent.   
  2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right 
of  everyone  to  be  free  from hunger,  shall  take,  individually  and  through  international  co‐
operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed:   
  (a)  To  improve  methods  of  production,  conservation  and  distribution  of  food 
  by  making  full  use  of  technical  and  scientific  knowledge,  by  disseminating 
  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  nutrition  and  by  developing  or  reforming 
  agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient   development 
and utilization of natural resources;   
  (b)  Taking  into  account  the  problems  of  both  food‐importing  and  food‐
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at all  times to adequate  food or means  for  its procurement.”41 This  is, “inseparable  from 
social  justice,  requiring  the  adoption  of  appropriate  economic,  environmental  and  social 
policies,  at  both  the  national  and  international  levels,  oriented  to  the  eradication  of 
poverty  and  the  fulfillment  of  all  human  rights  for  all.”42  The  obligation  to  ensure  the 
adequacy of food also necessarily implies that the supply of food must be sustainable; i.e. 
that it will be “accessible for both present and future generations.”43 Moreover, such food 
must  be  available  “in  a  quantity  and  quality  sufficient  to  meet  the  dietary  needs  of 




“…  international  law  recognizes  that  the  content of  the  right  to  food 
has  twin  elements  of  availability  and  accessibility.  The  first  element 
refers  to  a  sufficient  supply  of  food  and  requires  the  existence  of  a 
national  supply  of  food  to  meet  the  nutritional  needs  of  the 
population  generally…  The  second  element  requires  that  people  be 
able  to  acquire  the  food  that  is  available  or  to  make  use  of 
opportunities to produce food for their own use.”45 







44  Id. para. 8. See, also paras. 9 – 11, and Articles 24(2)(c) and 27 of  the Convention on  the Rights of  the Child 
[CRC], G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. 49 at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (20 November 1989), 
(calling  upon  state  parties  to  take  appropriate  measures  to  combat  disease  and  malnutrition  by,  inter  alia, 
providing  adequate  nutritious  food  and  clean  drinking  water);  U.N.  General  Assembly  Resolution  57/226:  The 
Right  to Food,  (affirming “the right of everyone to have access  to safe and nutritious  food, consistent with  the 
right  to adequate  food and the  fundamental  right of everyone to be  free  from hunger so as  to be able  fully  to 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As for the persons fixed with obligations under the right to food, General Comment No. 12 
holds  that both  state and private46  actors have  responsibilities  in  achieving  its  aims,  and 
that these be fulfilled with all deliberate speed. All parties subject to the right to food are 
required  to  acquit  their  responsibilities  arising  under  the  right  to  adequate  food 








health,  and  environmental  protection.  Eide  visualized  the  range  of  claimants  and  duty 
bearers  with  respect  to  human  rights  by  categorizing  the  various  obligations  of  States 
under the right to food as duties to respect, to protect, and to fulfill or facilitate.50 The duty 
to respect can be likened to the physician’s motto of “first, do no harm”: it is essentially a 
duty  upon  the  State  not  to  interfere  and  thereby  adversely  affect  existing  access  to 
adequate food. States for instance may not burn the fields and salt the earth upon which 
unpopular  minorities  depend  for  farming.51  The  duty  to  protect,  on  the  other  hand, 
requires States “to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their 
access  to  adequate  food.”52  Lastly,  the  duty  to  fulfill  or  facilitate means  that  “the  State 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must  pro‐actively  engage  in  activities  intended  to  strengthen  people’s  access  to  and 
utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security.”53 
 
The  interface  between  the  right  to  food  and  forms  of  market  regulation  such  as 
competition law falls mainly within the State’s duty to protect human rights: States “must 
intervene where  acts  committed  by  private  parties, whether  individuals,  groups  or  legal 
persons,  threaten to violate those rights.”54 Fundamentally,  the duty to protect proceeds 
from  an  appreciation  of  the  tremendous  influence  private  actors  such  as  multinational 
corporations  have  over  individual  lives,  and  of  the  intimate  connections  between  such 
private actors and the State. The instances of such power and influence can be separated 
into two categories. The first category comprises those instances where States and private 
actors  work  hand  in  glove  to  further  private  commercial  interests.  The  most  notorious 




and  multilateral  investment  treaties  on  behalf  of  their  corporations;  offer  investment 
insurance  through  their  export  credit  agencies  to  cover  the  risks  of  adverse  political 




The  second  category  covers  those  instances  where  private  individuals  and  corporations 
exercise power and  influence  independent of official  assistance or  complicity, or even  in 
the face of official disapproval. An example of private or corporate power frustrating the 
best‐laid plans of policymakers  in the context of the right to food is provided by People’s 
Union  for  Civil  Liberties  v. Union  of  India  and Others,57 where  the  Indian  Supreme Court 
issued directions to the federal and state governments of India to put in place certain food 









the  French  government  reportedly weighed  in pushing  for  a  rewriting of  the  terms of  concessions  for  a water 
utility  [Aguas  Argentinas],  after  the  French  parent  company  [Suez  Lyonnaise]  that  had  signed  the  agreements 
found them less profitable than it had thought.”  
57 Writ Petition [Civil] No. 196 of 2001 (Supreme Court of India). 






freedom  from  hunger  in  India,  and  even  these  orders  have  been 











Certain  objections  of  principle  are  routinely  invoked  against  the  contention  that  states 
have a positive duty to protect human rights. The idea that the individual may demand as a 
human right certain types of legislation from the State, implies that individuals can require 




social  project.”59  It  is  argued  accordingly  that  State  involvement  in  engineering  and 
modifying socio‐economic arrangements are illegitimate attempts at social engineering or 
cultural manipulation, aimed at enforcing positive liberties;  i.e. freedom “to”, rather than 
freedom  “from.”60  Closely  linked  to  this  argument  is  the  strong  libertarian  notion of  the 
                                            
58  Fourth  Report  of  the  Commissioner  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  India  in  pursuant  to  People’s  Union  for  Civil 
Liberties  v.  Union  of  India  and  others  (Writ  Petition  [Civil]  No.  196  of  2001)  (14  August  2003).  Available  at: 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scfour.doc (last accessed 23 November 2010). 
59 Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity  in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 246 (2008). See, 
also  221‐222:  “The  socialist  aspect  of  human  dignity  is  also  reflected  in  the  positive  rights  set  forth  in  many 





compatible  with  a  full  degree  of  participation  in  a  common  life,  with  its  demands  for  cooperation,  solidarity, 
fraternity. But beyond all  these there  is an acuter  issue:  the paramount need to satisfy claims of other, no  less 
ultimate values:  justice, happiness,  love,  the realisation of capacities  to create new things and experiences and 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proper role of the State as being a mere cipher with regards to relations between private 
individuals.61  The  most  breathtaking  example  of  the  “state‐as‐cipher”  mentality  can  be 
found  in DeShaney  v. Winnebago County, where  the U.S.  Supreme Court held  that  State 
child protection authorities were not  liable  in damages for  failing,  through negligence,  to 
protect a child that suffered irreparable and debilitating physical harm at the hands of an 
abusive  parent.62  Although  the  state  was  mandated  by  statute  to  prevent  such 
occurrences, the harm, it was held, arose solely from the actions of a private individual, the 
abusive parent,  and not  from  the  State.63  The private  sphere of  action,  as  the argument 
goes, is distinct and separate from the public. 
 
A  thorough  treatment  of  the  incoherence  of  libertarianism  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
paper.  Nevertheless,  a  few  observations  may  be  made.  First,  some  level  of  social 
embedding and commitment is clearly needed with respect to specific social projects, such 
as  preventing  murders,  torture  and  other  serious  crimes:  individuals  can  justifiably  be 
required to commit  themselves to a system prohibiting such conduct, and we should say 
that  something must be very wrong with a  legal  system  that  failed  to do  so.  Indeed, we 
should say  that  it was  in violation of some very  important human rights obligations.64 As 
                                            












Covenant  rights  by  its  agents,  but  also  against  acts  committed  by  private  persons  or 





nature and circumstances of  the alleged acts and to establish  the  identity of any person who might have been 
involved therein”, in the aftermath of a pogrom against the Roma community in Danilovgrad, now Montenegro). 
States also have a duty  to prevent  such human rights violations  from occurring:  see Human Rights Committee, 
Herrera  Rubio  et  al  v.  Colombia,  Communication  No.  161/1983,  decision  of  2  November  1987  and  UN  Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/2  at 192, (1990), paras. 10.3, 11 (finding a violation of Article 6 ICCPR “because the State party failed 
to  take appropriate measures  to prevent  the disappearance and subsequent killings of  Jose Herrera and Emma 
Rubio  de  Herrera  and  to  investigate  effectively  the  responsibility  for  their  murders…”  at  para.  11)  and  Inter‐
American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez‐Rodriguez v. Honduras (Merits), Judgement of July 29, 1988, Series C 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such,  there  is no universally applicable prohibition on drafting citizens  into service  for all 
social  projects.  But,  perhaps  it  is  possible  to  draw  some  kind of  distinction between  the 
State’s  regulation  of  the  relations  between  private  persons  (where  it  is  under  a  rights‐
based  obligation),  and  its  regulation  of  the  general  societal  conditions  that  give  rise  to 
these private relations.  
 
Rao  for  instance  considers  that  socio‐economic  rights  are  really  values  and  ideals.65  She 
implies  that  socio‐economic  rights are  really no more  than general  societal  conditions  to 
be desired, and that conflating them with “real” civil and political rights risks trivializing the 
concept  of  rights,  which  is  of  peremptory  “trumps”  over  all  other  considerations.  This 





on  the other hand,  is  something we normally  explore under  the banner of  ethics, which 
asks the questions: “how should I live my life?” or “how should I seek happiness?” Should 
one  spend  one’s  life  in  religious  contemplation,  collecting  and  appreciating  great  art,  or 
working on a cure for cancer? Rao is correct when she says that a political authority should 
not dictate conceptions of ethical value  to  its  subjects:  it  should not  for  instance  impose 
particular  a  particular  religious  outlook  on  non‐believers,  nor  should  it  tell  homosexuals 
that they may not seek happiness with those they truly love. Rao is also completely correct 
in  saying  that  the  tendency  of  using  the  concept  of  “dignity”  in  constitutional  law  is  to 
conflate  these  two  different  questions.66  However,  this  is  because  the  two  sets  of 
questions  are  not  completely  distinct:  it  would  be  a  violation  of  rights/morality  to 
unreasonably deny an  individual  the chance at pursuing her conception of  the good, and 
equally,  it would  be  impossible  to  live  a  truly  good  life  unless  one  treated  others  justly. 












forth  in many modern  constitutions...  [which]  are  committed  to  viewing  individual  rights within broader  social 
goals and values.” 
66 Id. 222‐227. 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corporations  exercising  “private”  power  are  actually  exercising  power  conferred  upon 
them  by  laws  creating  and  regulating  market  behavior.  Thus,  government  is  always 
somehow  implicated  in  private  decisions.”67  Amartya  Sen  demonstrates  this  necessity  in 
the  context  of  the  right  to  food:  in  the  last  Bengal  famine  (1943),  three million  people 





relations  (ownership  rights,  contractual  obligations,  legal  exchanges, 
etc.). The  law stands between food availability and food entitlement. 




for  the  conditions  that  support  exercises  of  private  relations  resulting  in  clear  injustice. 
Human  rights  obligations  must  therefore  inform  these  relations.70  As  such,  the  duty  to 










administrative  law.  Certainly,  competition  regimes  often  contain  public  enforcement  bodies,  and  competition 
harm is generally seen as harm to the market as a whole, rather than to one or a few specific undertakings. There 
are  two  reasons  for my  choosing  to  characterise  competition  law  as  a  form  of  private  law.  First,  it  would  be 
comparatively easier to formulate the argument that administrative laws and procedures should be cognizant of 
human rights obligations, and I find that in order to properly counter an argument, that argument has to be put at 
its  strongest.  Second,  one  very  influential  competition  regime,  the  US,  operates  to  a  very  significant  extent 
through private litigation. 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with  ‘the  protection  of  the  competitive  process  to  ensure  an  efficient  allocation  of 
resources, lower prices and greater consumer choice.”71 In other words, the main thrust of 
most competition regimes at present is the protection of the interests of end consumers. 
For  example, Neelie  Kroes,  the previous  European Commissioner  for  Competition Policy, 
articulated this position in a speech given in London in October 2005: 
 






In  this way,  it  is  argued  that  “a  basic  lesson  of  the  economics  of  vertical  restraints,  and 
exclusionary conduct in general, is that antitrust analysis need only be concerned with the 





good  thing  leading  to  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources;  the  downward  pressure 
forces less efficient producers to merge, cut their costs, or to exit the market, leaving the 
field open for more efficient ones. Buyer concentration is especially beneficial if the buyer 
                                            
71 M. Gangi, Competition  Policy  and  the  Exercise  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights,  LUISS Working  Paper  353,  357 
(1999).  
72  SPEECH/05/512,  available  at  www.ec/europa/eu,  (Last  Accessed:    19  November  2010).  See,  also  UK 
Competition  Commission,  describing  competition  as  “a  process  of  rivalry  between  firms…  seeking  to  win 
customers’ business over time.” Merger References: Competition Commission Guidelines (June 2003, CC 2), para. 
1.20; and Market Investigation References: Competition Commission Guidelines (June 2003, CC 2), para. 1.16); U.S. 
Federal  7th  Circuit  in  University  Life  Insurance  Co.  v.  Unimarc  Ltd.,  699  F.2d  846,  853  (7th  Cir.)  (1983)  defining 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power  essentially  acts  as  a  countervailing  force  against  powerful  sellers,74  or  if  the  cost 
savings  are  then  passed  on  to  consumers.  For  the  most  part,  modern  competition  law 
generally considers buyer power a positively benign pro‐competitive force or, at the very 
least,  a matter  of  little  or  no  competitive  concern.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  relative 
paucity  of  case‐law  on  buyer  power;  even  though  buyer  power  featured  prominently 
among  the  major  concerns  of  the  legislators  who  promoted  the  Sherman  Act,75  it  is 
remarkable to note that the European Courts76 – both the General Court (ex Court of First 
Instance) and the Court of Justice – have not broached the subject even once. The closest 
thing one  can  find  to a mention of buyer power of  the non‐countervailing  variety  in  the 
jurisprudence of  the  European Courts  is  the  following  comment  in  passing  by Advocate‐
General Maduro in FENIN:  
 
…the  existence  of  a  monopsony  does  not  pose  a  serious  threat  to 
competition  since  it  does  not  necessarily  have  any  effect  on  the 
downstream market. Furthermore, an undertaking in a monopsonistic 








the  Republic  in  order…  (e)  to  ensure  that  small  and  medium‐sized  enterprises  have  an 
                                            
74 Case T‐342/99, Airtours v. Commission [2006] ECR II‐2585, para. 277 (General Court), Case 322/81, Michelin v. 






















on  “the  ability  of  small  businesses  or  firms  controlled  or  owned  by  historically 
disadvantaged  persons  to  come  competitive.”  Ch.  4,  part  B  of  the  Act  allows  the 
Competition Tribunal to exempt for up to five years otherwise anticompetitive agreements 
if they, inter alia, promote “the ability of small businesses and or firms controlled or owned 




Except  for  that  of  social  redistribution,  U.S.  antitrust  law  reflected  attitudes  and 
motivations  broadly  similar  to  the  abovementioned  provisions  of  South  African 
competition  law  until  the  Reagan  administration.  In  U.S.  v.  Von’s  Grocery  Co.,  the  U.S. 
Supreme Court held that “(t)hroughout the history of  these statutes  [i.e. Sherman Act]  it 
has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, 
for  its  own  sake  and  in  spite  of  possible  cost,  an  organization  of  industry  in  small  units 
which  can  effectively  compete  with  each  other.”80  Black  J.  was  slightly  off  the  mark  in 
saying  that  the  preservation  of  small  businesses  was  “for  its  own  sake”;  earlier,  the 
Supreme Court had held that the purpose and reason for this legislative stipulation was in 
order  “to  yield  the  best  allocation  of  our  economic  resources,  the  lowest  prices,  the 
highest  quality  and  the  greatest material  progress, while  at  the  same  time  providing  an 
environment  conducive  to  the  preservation  of  our  democratic  political  and  social 
institutions.”81  This  ordoliberal  conception  of  antitrust  law  as  providing  the 
“comprehensive  charter  of  economic  liberty”82  began  to  unravel  in  the  late  1970s  in  an 
environment  of  “rapidly  accelerating  inflation,  lower  productivity,  and  increasingly 
negative balance of payments, and dramatic advances by Japanese and German producers 
in  world markets….”83  Given  the  need  to  compete  with  cheap  imports,  fears  about  the 
nefarious effects of big business upon the integrity of the economy and the political system 
came to be seen as an unaffordable luxury.84 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collect  enormous  sums  to  finance  their  various  electoral  campaigns, 




advantage  in  the  competition  for  votes,  and  new  and  poor  political 
organizations are for that reason alone at a usually fatal disadvantage. 
Large  campaign  contributors  purchase what  is  euphemistically  called 
“access” to officials; in fact they often purchase not merely access but 
control.  Big  money  poisons  politics  in  yet  another  way,  moreover, 
which  is often  less noticed.  It puts enormous sums at  the disposal of 





These  concerns  by  and  large  have  yet  to  filter  into  antitrust  law,  especially  in  the  US,88 
where  consumer  welfare  protection  remains  the  animating  principle.  As  such,  it  would 
appear  that modern  competition  law  is  indefensible because  it  is  fundamentally  at  odds 
with the right to food, in that while the former protects only consumers, the most pressing 
                                            
85 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 




88  If  anything,  Citizens  United  shows  that  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  is  at  any  rate  positively  embracing  an 
unquestioning  acceptance  of  the  benevolence  of  corporate  power,  given  the  “marketplace”  concept  of  the 
freedom of expression underlying Kennedy J.’s opinion. 







There  are  objections  to  buyer  power  that  can  be  formulated  from  the  perspective  of 
consumer welfare. The most obvious one concerns when the sole or dominant buyer also 
has considerable market power in the downstream selling market. Conventional economic 
theory  stipulates  that  the monopsonist  (M),  in  order  to maximize profits, will  effectively 
reduce its demand for the input it purchases, and in the process reduce the price that the 




the  downstream  selling  market  is  competitive,  other  producers  will  make  up  for  M’s 
shortfall, and the immediate welfare of end consumers will arguably not be affected.89 If, 
on  the  other  hand, M  is  also  dominant  in  the  downstream market,  the  welfare  of  end 
consumers  will  be  adversely  affected  by  the  diminution  in  quantity  of  the  end  product 
available,  which  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  monopoly  sellers  tend  to  depress  the 
quantity of their output in order to maximize their profits.90 
 
However, M  can,  at  least  in  theory,  address  quite  easily  the  problem  of  reduced  input, 
through price discrimination and market segmentation. The reason why levels of inputs in 
the upstream market  is  reduced  is  because  at  the price offered by M,  some who would 
otherwise  have  produced  the  input,  decide  not  to  do  so.  M  must  therefore  obtain  its 
inputs  from the  remaining  few who are glad  to  supply at  that  low price.  If, on  the other 
                                            
89 Some may be curious as to how a producer can wield monopsony or dominant buyer power in its input markets 
while at the same time having nothing of the sort in its downstream product market. Consider the example of a 
milk pasteurising plant. The  input –  fresh milk –  is highly perishable, and can be viably  transported only over a 
short  range  before  it  becomes  unsaleable.  As  such,  if  there  are  no  other milk  processing  plants  in within  this 
geographical range, that plant will wield buyer power. However, the end product, pasteurised milk, is much less 
perishable,  and  can  be  transported  nationally,  or  even  globally.  As  such,  the  plant will  not  probably  have  any 
market power in its downstream market. 




market power  increases, Sexton and Zhang show that “only extraordinary  increases  in efficiency could possibly 
offset the deadweight welfare loss” the occurs when a firm is has power on both buying and selling markets. Op. 
cit.  Peter  Carstensen, Buyer  Power,  Competition  Policy  and  Antitrust:  the  competitive  effects  of  discrimination 
among suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 283, (note 26) (2008). 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hand, it were possible to offer each producer precisely the price he or she were willing to 
accept  in order  to begin  to produce  the  input,  there would be no  reduction at all  in  the 







Leaving  aside  the  obvious  interjection  that  perfect  price  discrimination  (i.e.  perfect 
congruence of M’s offer with the price at which each individual seller is willing to begin to 
produce)  is  unlikely  to  occur  in  practice,  such  buyer  power  nevertheless  produces 
important  consumer  harms,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  M  engages  in  price 
discrimination.  These  harms  occur,  however,  only  in  the  long‐term.  The  setting  of  input 
prices at precisely the level where suppliers are willing to begin to produce, means that all 
producer welfare is appropriated by M. Thus, the suppliers may have nothing to set aside 
for  such  things  as  research  and  innovation,  or  even  the  replacement  of  deteriorating 
capital equipment. As such, over time, the quality of goods enjoyed by end consumers will 
decline,  as  suppliers  either  exit  the  market  or  consolidate,  while  new  entrants  are 
discouraged  from  replacing  them due  to  the  lack of  incentive  to do  so. Where  suppliers 
react  to  such  buyer  power  by  themselves  merging  and  combining,  end  consumers  can 
expect their choices to diminish.  
 
It  has  been  argued  that  pure monopsony  is  exceedingly  rare  in  any market.  Rather,  it  is 
more common to find that a market is dominated by a few powerful purchasers, and this 
alters  the  analysis  somewhat.  It  was  stated  earlier  that  monopsonies  can  be  consumer 
welfare‐enhancing  if  cost  savings are passed on  to end consumers.93 Dominant buyers  in 
food  supply  chains  do  not  generally  seem  to  do  this;  instead,  cost  savings  derived  from 
driving  down  supplier  prices  tend  to  be  retained  by  both  input  processors  and  end 
retailers.94  One  explanation  for  this  phenomenon,  especially  in  the  retail  sector,  is  that 
                                            
91 RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 79–86 (2001). Posner demonstrates, on the selling side, that a monopoly could 
produce at the efficient quantity demanded by society instead of at a level below that, if it was able to effectively 
charge  individual  buyers  a  unique  price  that  was  proportionately  related  to  their  willingness  to  purchase. 
Moreover, he identifies this as the real source of the objection to tying and bundling.  





for  coffee  dropped only  27%. At  the  same  time  in  2001,  Starbucks’  and Nestlé’s  profits  rose  by  41%  and  20% 
respectively: Celine Charveriat, Bitter Coffee: How the Poor are Paying for the Slump in Coffee Prices, Oxfam (16 
May 2001); op. cit PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF FOOD: THE COMING CRISIS IN THE WORLD FOOD INDUSTRY 159 (2008). 






trudge  wearily  from  one  supermarket  to  another  in  search  of  a  better  bargain.  This 
defense  misses  the  point:  surely  this  is  not  supposed  to  happen  in  a  competitive  and 





welfare will,  in  the  fullness of  time, be detrimental  to  consumer welfare. An example of 
this above rationale being applied by competition authorities and tribunals may be found 
in  the  UK  Competition  Commission’s  regulation  of  certain  abusive  practices  by  large 
supermarket retailers in the 2008 Groceries Market Investigation. Such practices were held 
to  transfer  so  much  risk  and  uncertainty  to  producers  that  they  could  potentially  have 
resulted in the abovementioned harms to consumers.96 The European Commission has also 
held  that dominant buyers may possess  the ability  to dictate  to consumers  the choice of 




balling  the  importance  of  competition  control  of monopsony  or  dominant  buyer  power; 
the expectation that buyers  like M will not squeeze their suppliers too much, because M 
has an  interest  in maintaining viable sources of supply. The events of  the past  two years 
have not inspired confidence in the propensity of, at the very least, the banking sector to 
self‐regulate  in  accordance  with  its  long‐term  interests,  and  nothing  particularly 
distinguishes in this regard them from other private profit‐making actors. Indeed, one may 
suspect that a firm that gets into particular habits of dealing with its suppliers over a long 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III. The Consumerist Objection to the Commodity Problem 
 
The  preceding  discussion  provides  some  reason  why  a  consumer‐welfare  oriented 
competition  regime  should  be  concerned  about  the  abuse  of  dominant  buyer  power. 
However,  the  tendency  of many  agricultural markets  to  display  the  commodity  problem 





producers  falls  below  marginal  cost,  such  that  sufficient  numbers  of  them  leave  the 
market.  Regardless  of  how  farmers  and  producers  may  fare  under  this  arrangement,  it 




of  high quality  arabica  coffee  from Kenya has  been  replaced  to  a  significant  extent with 
cheaper but lower quality robusto beans from Vietnam. Losses in quality were masked by 
additional processing by firms further up the supply chains, and the addition of flavorings 
and  sugar.100 Although  consumers  still  get  their  coffee,  their  range of  choice  and quality 
has been reduced. The downward and upward spirals respectively of price and quantity of 
supply are ultimately unsustainable;  the circle ends when producers  stop  replacing worn 




A  close  and  detailed  examination  of  the  particular  types  of  abusive  conduct  taken  by 
dominant or monopsony buyers would be beyond  the scope of  this  short paper.  Indeed, 
they appear to be practically unlimited. They range from dominant buyers demanding such 
large  volume  discounts  that  suppliers  are  obliged  to  raise  prices  for  other  buyers  (the 
“waterbed effect”),101 retrospectively adjusting terms of supply to pass on costs and risks 
                                            
99 See, text pertaining to note 89. 
100 THE END OF FOOD, 157 – 158. 
101  See,  Paul  Dobson  &  Roman  Inderst,  Differential  Buyer  Power  and  the  Waterbed  Effect:  Do  Strong  Buyers 
Benefit  or  Harm  Consumers?  28  EUR.  COMPETITION  L.  REV.  393  (2007)  and  Paul  Dobson  &  Roman  Inderst,  The 
Waterbed  Effect: Where Buying and  Selling Power Come Together, WISCONSIN  L.  REV.  331  (2008). As  a  result  of 
dominant buyers being supplied at  lower prices than non‐dominant ones, dominant buyers are able to pass on 
cost  savings  to  end  consumers,  which  only  increases  the  dominant  buyer’s  market  share  in  the  downstream 
market. Thus a vicious circle is set into motion. 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to  suppliers,102  or methods  of  off‐market  contracting  aimed  at  reducing  transparency  in 
markets.103 Some types of abusive conduct, such as  the passing on of excessive risks and 
costs  to  suppliers,  are  aimed  simply  at  capturing  welfare  from  producers,  while  others, 
such as “waterbedding” and predatory bidding up of  input prices,104 also have this effect 









or  an  inequitably  large  proportion  thereof,  such  that  the  seller  cannot  pass  on  these 
savings  to  other  buyers.  This  then  puts  the  non‐dominant  buyers  at  a  competitive 
disadvantage  in  the  downstream  market,  leading  to  the  acquisition  by  the  firm  of 
dominance  on  both  the  buying  and  selling  markets.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
disadvantage  borne  by  smaller  buyers  need  not  necessarily  manifest  itself  in  price 
increases; they may come in the form of shortages in supply to smaller buyers because of 
volume  purchases  by  large,  dominant  ones,  or  in  poorer  service  by  sellers  to  smaller 
buyers. 
 
According  to  the Working Paper on  the Waterbed Effect  (henceforth Working Paper)  the 
intuitive explanation for the waterbed effect is as the result of a “virtuous circle”106 that is 
                                            
102 Of the 52 practices investigated by the Commission, 26 were concerned with “practices that have the potential 
to create uncertainty for suppliers regarding their revenues or costs as a result of the transfer of excessive risks or 
unexpected  costs  to  suppliers”.  See, UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market  Investigation  (2008),  para. 
9.52, at 166‐67. 
103 Carstensen, supra, note 90, 283 – 284. 
104 Weyerhaeuser  Co.  v.  Ross‐Simmons  Hardwood  Lumber  Company,  Inc.,  549  U.S.  312  (2007)(Thomas  J.).  The 
Supreme Court applied to predatory bidding the same test it applies to predatory pricing, as established in Brooke 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caused  by  some  buyers  being  larger  than  others.  A  refusal  by  a  seller  to  supply  would 
affect a large buyer less than it would affect a small buyer. As such, small buyers are in a 
worse  bargaining  position  than  large  ones,  and  are  not  able  to  demand  the  same  low 
prices extracted by large buyers. These lower input costs will be passed on to the buyer’s 
own customers in the form of lower prices, thus reinforcing the large buyer’s competitive 
edge.  As  large  buyers  become  even  larger  (i.e.  by  retailers  opening more  outlets),  their 
bargaining  power  increases,  as  does  their  competitive  advantage  over  small  buyers.107 










Consumer  welfare  may  be  diminished  in  a  number  of  ways:108  for  instance,  if  the 
downstream  market  is  also  sufficiently  concentrated,  dominant  buyers  will  face  less 
pressure  from  their  competitors, meaning  that  there will  be  little  incentive  for  them  to 
pass on cost savings  to  the end consumer. This means consumers may end up paying an 
artificially  high  price.  Alternatively,  consumer  welfare  may  be  diminished  if  such 
“waterbedding”  results  in  sellers  leaving  the  market  or  foregoing  investment  in  capital 
replacement  and  innovation.  Consumers  may  thus  be  left  with  less  choice  in  products, 
retail outlets, or lower quality products.109 
 
With  regard  to enforcement, competition  law  faces a big problem  in  fashioning effective 
remedies  for such abusive pricing practices of  individual  firms. Firstly, as may be gleaned 
from  the  above  discussion,  it  may  be  difficult  to  distinguish  an  abusive  price  from  a 
legitimate price extracted by a large buyer on account of its purchasing economies of scale. 
However,  this difficulty  should not be exaggerated. The crucial  factor  should be whether 
the  seller  increases  costs  to  small buyers  in  response  to discounts given  to  large buyers. 
Moreover, as the Working Paper observes, “buyer size reflects buyer power”,110 meaning 










Secondly there  is  the matter of  fashioning a remedy. Competition authorities around the 
world will be rightfully wary of directly setting sale prices. One possible solution would be 
to  ensure  that  there  is  only  one  sale  price  offered  by  the  seller.  This  is  the  approach 
favored  by  the  U.S.  Robinson‐Patman  Act.112  However,  the  Act  places  the  burden  of 
enforcement in that it places the burden of compliance upon the seller, who is one of the 







To  reiterate,  the  standard  problem  identified  with  the  tendency  of  the monopsonist  to 
depress price is the reduction of output by the seller, which in turn reduces the productive 
capacity of  the dominant buyer. One way  the dominant buyer may  retain prior  levels of 
supply is by adopting an “all‐or‐nothing” buying strategy. This involves the buyer telling the 
seller  that  it  requires  a minimum  total  level  of  output  before  it will  buy  anything  at  all. 
Whereas the increased production levels demanded of the seller means that economies of 





poultry  raising markets.  Poultry  raising  contracts  involve  an  exclusive  buyer  determining 
the  number  of  chickens  to  place  with  each  individual  farmer,  and  this  will  normally 
coincide  with  the  buyer’s  needs.115  Especially  in  the  context  of  retail  markets,  such 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contracts tend to result in the seller transferring the higher marginal costs of its increased 
production  to  other  retailers who  do  not  have  buyer  power.  This  contributes  to  a  retail 
“waterbed” effect.116 
 
Also  important  in  this  regard  are  confidentiality  clauses,  which  increase  the  “switching 
costs”  borne  by  producers  by  reducing  the  amount  of  transparency  in  the market.  They 
work  particularly  to  the disadvantage of  sellers,  by  leaving  them unable  to  compare  the 
various options available to them.117 The secrecy also allows buyers to set prices differently 
for  different  producers.  Such  clauses  are  common  in  contractual  relations  in  livestock 
markets between select  feeders and  large meat packers.  Increasing  transparency  in  food 
markets will allow sellers to be able to bargain for more value should they know that other 











not  insisted  on  the  all‐or‐nothing  clause.  This  welfare  gain  may  be  passed  on  to  end 
consumers,  especially  if  the  downstream  market  is  competitive.  The  answer  to  this 
argument  is  twofold.  First  of  all,  in  the  short  run,  the  use  of  all‐or‐nothing  clauses may 
result  in  a  net  loss  of  total  welfare,  especially  in  retail  markets,  because  the  dominant 
buyer who enjoys  low prices will  not  increase his  consumption, while  the non‐dominant 
buyers who are  “waterbedded” are  likely  to  reduce  their purchases as a  result of higher 
prices.118  Consumer welfare may be  adversely  affected by  excluding  the  competing non‐
dominant sellers. Secondly, even  in  input markets, the appropriation of producer welfare 
also destroys any incentive for the seller to produce, thereby encouraging him to exit the 
market at  the nearest opportunity.  In  the context of  farming,  it  is clear  that such an exit 
may not be made with ease, since farming communities are often tied to the land by their 
substantial sunk costs. Instead, the disincentive to continue production will be reflected in 
a  failure  to  invest  in new capital  equipment as depreciation occurs, meaning  that  future 
production and innovation will be compromised. 
                                            















privileges  some  suppliers  over  others,  by  giving  the  former  group  contracts  with  better 
prices than that offered on the open market. Thus, such contracts can be used as to exploit 
individual  sellers,  as  well  as  exclude  others.  However,  as  highlighted  above,  price 
discrimination is objectionable even if there is no exclusionary effect. The same is true of 
tying and bundling agreements. By,  for example, bundling  ink cartridges to the sale of  its 
printers,  a  dominant  printer manufacturer  could  effectively  charge  its  customers  a  price 
reflective  of  their  demand  for  the  printer.  This  would  effectively  allow  the  seller  to 
appropriate all consumer welfare. Richard Posner argues that this is the true ground of the 
objection  to  tying  and  bundling,  because  it  remains  true  even  where  the  “leveraged” 
market is not remotely capable of being monopolized.120 It is acknowledged that the above 
objection,  translated  to  the  context  of  all‐or‐nothing  clauses,  reduces  producer  welfare 
rather  than  consumer  welfare,  which  is  the  main  (or  even  sole)  concern  of  most 
competition  regimes.  However,  as  also  demonstrated  above,  the  appropriation  of 
producer welfare will have adverse effects upon consumer welfare in the long run. 
 
The  use  of  “all‐or‐nothing”  clauses  for  the  purposes  of  ensuring  the  buyer’s  supply may 




farm  production  excessively  towards  sale  and/or  export.  According  to  Carstensen,  such 
contract clauses do not present much of an enforcement problem for competition law. He 
argues that one can set out with comparative ease theories as to why such all‐or‐nothing 
contracts  are  harmful  to  competition.  The  remedy  may  come  in  the  form  of  a  simple 
injunction or a regulation prohibiting buyers from buying other than in set quantities, and 
requiring  them to accept  tenders  from all potential  sellers.121 A  caveat must be made  to 
                                            
119  See,  e.g.  U.S.  v.  United  Shoe Machinery  Corp.,  391  U.S.  244  (1968);  Case  T‐30/89, Hilti  AG  v.  Commission 












In  retail  markets,  suppliers  make  investment  decisions  based  on  variable  market 
conditions.  All  decisions  are  made  by  estimating  the  likely  returns  and  balancing  them 
against the risks  involved by that particular course of conduct. Retail buyers on the other 
hand,  have  strong  incentives,  given  the  stressful  nature  of  the  sales  market,  to  pass 
excessive risks and unexpected costs onto their suppliers. Such conduct will have the effect 
of  capturing  excessive  supplier  welfare,  thereby  removing  seller’s  incentive  to  invest  in 
capital  equipment  and  innovation.123  According  to  the  UK  Competition  Commission, 






Retailers  may  increase  the  price  of  access  to  their  shelves  and  thereby  transfer  wealth 
from sellers to retailers by charging sellers a fee for stocking their products. Moreover, in 







As  demonstrated  above,  a  plausible  argument  can  be  made  for  the  curtailing  of  buyer 
concentration and power in agricultural markets, from the standpoint of consumer welfare 
protection alone. To reiterate, the consumer harms arising from certain types of dominant 
buyer  conduct  may  manifest  only  in  the  long‐run,  and  until  that  time,  remain 





unexpected  costs  to  suppliers”.  See, UK Competition Commission, Groceries Market  Investigation  (2008),  para. 
9.52, at 166‐67. 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indeterminate  or  vague.  This  raises  some  questions  about  the  propriety  of  competition 
control  in  the  present,  given  that  the  goal  of  attaining  efficient,  competitive markets  is 
undermined by excessive regulation, just as much as it is by under‐regulation. Accordingly, 
competition  regimes  generally  require  a  showing  of  identifiable  and  likely  harms  to 






example  of  the  Kenyan  coffee  producers.  The  harm  to  consumer welfare  caused  by  the 
decline  in production of arabica beans was somewhat offset by coffee houses  turning  to 
robusto beans produced by Vietnamese  farmers,  the consequent decline  in quality being 
offset  to  some  extent  the  development  of  a  process  artificially  to  improve  the  flavor  of 
robusto coffee, as well as by the new practice of adding various flavorings and sugar.126 It 






harms manifesting  in  the  long‐term. Moreover,  it  should be observed  that  legal  systems 
have  never  shied  from  addressing  harmful  conduct  just  because  those  harms  are 
incalculable at present. Where damage is  incapable of being reduced to monetary terms, 
equitable  or  in  personam  remedies  are  traditionally  awarded.  Indeed,  the  use  of 
competition controls  to prevent  the occurrence of presently unquantifiable  future harms 
occurs  regularly  in  merger  regulation.  The  EU  Commission  for  instance,  has  on  many 
occasions  prohibited mergers  and  combinations  from  occurring  where  they  would  have 
resulted in the creation of dominant positions in purchasing markets.127 
 
Some may  counter,  assuming  the  existence of  credible merger  regulation,  that  it  should 
suffice  for  competition  control  of  abuses  of  dominance  to  apply  only  when  consumer 
harms arising  from buyer power reach some adequate  level of “ripeness”. This would be 
inadequate.  By  the  time  the  consumer  harms manifest  themselves  in  higher  prices  and 
reduced choice and quality, too many producers may have left the market or consolidated 
in order for competition remedies to have any corrective effect. In other words, it may be 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far too late to do anything. To take the example of the Kenyan arabica coffee bean farmers 
mentioned  above,  it  is  reasonably  clear  that  the  consumer  harms  of  higher  prices  and 
reduced availability of high quality arabica coffee will obtain only after significant numbers 
of producers have or consolidated, or  left the market altogether (i.e.,  left their mountain 






remedies proposed should be prophylactic  in nature. An  important example of  this more 
enriched  conception of  consumer harm  in  application may be  found  in  the UK Groceries 
Market  Investigation  (2008),  where  the  UK  Competition  Commission  held  that  it  was 
authorized  to  find  an  “Adverse  Effect  on Competition”  (AEC) without  having  to  “identify 
specific harm to the interests of” consumers.128 
 
However,  both  EU  competition  law  and US  antitrust  appear  to  have  set  their  respective 
faces against such prophylaxis. Under an abuse of dominance analysis per Article 102 TFEU 
(ex Article 82 EC), the difficulty lies in showing a “detrimental effect upon trade” within the 
EU, which  is  taken  to mean an adverse effect upon consumers. We are  thus  returned  to 
the  opinion  of  Advocate  General  Miguel  Poiares  Maduro  in  FENIN.  In  this  regard, 
Carstensen  notes  that  the  advantage  of  using  §  1  of  the  Sherman  Act  (prohibiting 
anticompetitive agreements) is that it requires far less of a showing of market power than 
would be required under § 2 (establishing the monopolization offence). Moreover, it would 
allow  courts  to  be  able  to  use  a Microsoft129  analytical  framework  while  relying  on  the 
smaller  threshold  of  market  power  allowed  under  §  1130  (the  provision  which  prohibits 
cartelisation, and whose equivalent  in EU  law  is Article 101 TFEU  (ex Art. 81 EC)). As per 
the analysis  in Microsoft,  the question of whether such an agreement  is anti‐competitive 
or abusive may be answered in the affirmative if (1) the plaintiff or competition authority is 
able  to  show harm  to  competition  (not  just  competitors)  in both  theory and  fact  (2)  the 
defendant firm is either unable to show that there is a legitimate business justification for 
its  conduct;  or  (3)  the  plaintiff  is  able  to  show  that  the  reasons  put  forward  by  the 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defendant  are  mere  pretexts,  or  that  the  same  pro‐competitive  business  reasons  could 
have been accomplished by less anti‐competitive means.131 
 




reluctant  to  scrutinize  such  agreements,  because  it  is  thought  that  such  practices  are 




restraint possesses market power. Roughly  the  same  rationale  lies behind  the  regulation 
setting out  a Block  Exemption  for Vertical  Restraints  in  EU Competition  law. Admittedly, 
the  current  Regulation  330/2010  on  Vertical  Restraints  is  an  improvement  on  the  now‐
expired  Regulation  2790/99.133  The  expired  Regulation  established  a  “safe  harbor”,  or 
presumption of legality for certain vertical agreements depending on the market share of 
the  supplier or buyer  and  the nature of  the  vertical  restriction, which, when  interpreted 
according to the European Commission’s Vertical Restraints Guidelines,134 (setting out the 
Commission’s  interpretation  of  the  regulation  –  not  binding  upon  the  EU’s  courts  but 
nevertheless  extremely  influential)  stipulated  that  the  market  share  of  the  buyer  is 
considered  only  if  the  vertical  restraint  concerned  contained  an  exclusive  supply 
obligation. Moreover, the safe harbor was available for buyers with a market share of up 
to 30%. Regulation 2790/99 expired  in May 2010.  The new  regulation,  as  interpreted by 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the new Commission Guidelines,135  provides  for  the buyer’s market  share  to be  relevant 
where it “purchases the contract goods or services which determine the applicability of the 
block exemption.”136 This  is a marked  improvement even upon draft versions of  the new 
guidelines, which considered the buyer’s market share only where  it  resells  the goods or 
services, or if those goods are inputs into the buyer’s own product.137 However, the buyer 
market  share  threshold  for  the  “safe  harbor”  remains  the  same  at  30%. Moreover,  the 
latest  guidelines  set  out  set  out  a  de  minimis  market  share  threshold  of  15%,138  under 
which the transaction is presumed to have no effect on trade within the common market. 






are  protected  by  consumer  welfare‐driven  competition  regimes  do  not  derive  from  the 
right  to  food.  Consumers  do  not  have  a  human  right  to  enjoy  arabica  coffee  now  and 
forever; they are not unjustly injured or diminished if they must content themselves with 
robusto instead. Such an eventuality, though no doubt disagreeable, neither reduces them 
to  hunger,  nor  robs  them  of  physical  and  economic  access  to  adequate  food.  Those 






One means  by which  consumerist  competition  laws  could  reflect  the  interface  between 
consumer interests and the demands of the right to food, would be by interpreting rules of 
competition law in conformity with the right to food. Such conform‐interpretation should 
result  in  lowering  or  modifying  the  de  minimis  and  appreciability  thresholds  identified 
above,  which  are  in  place  because  consumers  suffer  only  negligible  harm  below  those 
thresholds,  even  though  they  may  have  profound  effects  for  producers.  A  second 
important effect of conform‐interpretation would be the reinforcement of the consumerist 
argument  for controlling buyer conduct despite a  lack of presently  identifiable consumer 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harm.  The  UK  Competition  Commission’s  claim  to  be  empowered  to  find  an  AEC  is  at 
present only justifiable with reference to some kind of precautionary principle.140 Conform‐
interpretation with the right to food would reduce or remove the need for reliance on this 






human  rights  violations.  In  E.  and  Others  v.  United  Kingdom,142  the  European  Court  of 
Human  Rights  had  to  examine  whether  the  UK  was  liable  to  the  child  victims  of  their 
mother’s partner who had confessed to indecently assaulting them. He was sentenced to 
two  years  probation  on  the  condition  that  he  not  reside  in  the  family  home,  but  this 
condition was never adequately enforced by the local authorities. As a result, he returned 
to  the  family  home,  leading  to  further  sexual  abuse  against  the  applicants.  The  Court 
rejected the UK government’s argument that liability could be found only if it was proven 
that State intervention would definitely have prevented the human rights violation (which, 
in  this case, was Article 3 ECHR, on the right against  torture and  inhuman and degrading 
treatment).143  Instead,  it  found  that  “the  test under Article  3… does not  require  it  to be 
shown  that  “but  for”  the  failing  or  omission  of  the  public  authority  ill‐treatment  would 
never have happened. A  failure  to  take  reasonably available measures which  could have 
had a real prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm is sufficient to engage 
the responsibility of the State.”144 Of course, the above test applies to the civil and political 
right  against  torture  rather  than  to  socio‐economic  rights  such  as  the  right  to  food. 
However a difference in treatment would be difficult to explain without recourse to saying 
                                            
140 See, Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (2006). The precautionary principle, or 
various  expressions  thereof,  is  found  in  a  number  of  legal  and  policy  instruments  and  pronouncements,  both 
domestic  and  international: e.g. Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development  in  the ECE Region, 




Precautions  varieties.  The argument made by  the UK Competition Commission appears  to be most  akin  to  the 
Catastrophic Harm variant, which essentially states that where “risks have extremely bad worst‐case scenarios, it 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that  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  rights,  or  that  civil  and political  rights  are  qualitatively more 
important  than  socio‐economic  ones,  both  of  which  contradict  the  principle  of  the 
interdependence and indivisibility of the two sets of rights.145 
 
It must be observed that  the argument  for conform‐interpretation with the right  to  food 
proceeds  from  entirely  different  premises  than  the  ordoliberal  principle  of  democracy‐
protection  described  earlier,  although  such  concerns  could  possibly  be  accommodated 
under this second human rights‐compliant conception of competition law. Certainly, both 
conceptions of  competition  law  can be described as  concerned  to different  extents with 
the  promotion  of  rights  and  the  empowerment  of  classes  of  persons  systematically  and 
consistently  deprived  of  the  equal  opportunity  to  participate  in  society.146  The  evil 
identified  and  addressed  by  the  latter  is  not  the  corruption  of  democratic  processes 
through  the  influence  of  big  money,  but  the  deprivation  of  basic  minimum  levels  of 
individual welfare as a result of market failures. It rests on the simple notion that there is 
nothing  special  about  consumers  that  gives  them  a  moral  right  to  the  lowest  prices 
possible,147  even  at  the  cost  of  producers’  ability  to  earn  an  income  sufficient  to  enable 
them to function as equal members of society. 
 
However,  there  is  the objection  that  human  rights  protections  should be pursued under 
other  forms  of  regulation,  rather  than  built  directly  into  competition  laws.  At  present, 
some very influential voices on this issue argue that human rights requirements and other 
extraneous considerations are properly the business of other departments and authorities 
for  the  reason  that  competition  authorities  are  simply  not  equipped  with  the  tools  or 
                                            
145 See, Recitals 2 and 3 of the common preamble to the ICESCR and ICESCR; General Comment No. 3, supra, note 
47:  
  In  this  regard,  the  Committee  reaffirms  that  the  rights  recognized  in  the 
Covenant are susceptible of realization within the context of a wide variety of economic 
and political  systems, provided only  that  the  interdependence and  indivisibility of  the 

















potentially  legitimate  considerations  within  the  framework  of  an 
antitrust case. The old [ordoliberal] antitrust rules were over‐inclusive 
and path dependent because in an adjudicative context antitrust cases 
present  a  zero‐sum  game  (whereby  conduct  is  declared  legal  or 
illegal), and because  judicial  reasoning  is backward  looking and yet  it 
has  a  precedential  effect  in  other  market  settings.  A  court  cannot 
regulate  the  competitive  process,  which  is  ongoing  by  definition, 
through  one‐off  interventions  adjudicating  upon  a  particular 
practice.Once the need to go beyond broad and over inclusive rules of 
prohibition  is  accepted,  antitrust  decision  making  must  balance 






any  point  in  time,  or  even  over  a  period  of  time  is  not  enough  to  tell  us  whether  all 
individuals  are  free  from  hunger  or  have  physical  and  economic  access  to  a  minimum 
adequate amount of  food. A  famous example of  this  is Amartya Sen’s  “missing women”, 
i.e.  the  women  who  are  born  but  who  mysteriously  do  not  make  it  to  adulthood  in 
societies  such  as  South  Asia,  West  Asia,  North  Africa  and  China.150  Sen  states  that  this 
phenomenon  “has  to  be  analyzed  with  demographic,  medical,  and  social  information, 






fall  under  the  remit  of  other  policy  and  regulatory  institutions,  and  not  competition 
regimes.  





152  Karen  Kong, The Right  to  Food  for  All:  A  Right‐Based Approach  to Hunger  and  Social  Inequality,  32  SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 525, 533, 552 (2009). 
The Right to Food and Buyer Power 2010]                                                          1227 
But it is possible to run too far with this argument: if households in such communities are 
making absolutely too little income, one can be sure that not just women but also the men 
are  being  denied  their  right  to  food,  and  one  would  be  entitled  to  infer  also  that  the 




no  concern  over  their  ability  in  assessing  whether  producers  are  being  deprived  of  a 
minimum level of  income congruent with the right to adequate food, especially since the 
former  is  contingent  upon  the  latter.  The  core  argument  of  this  section  is  this:  while 
competition  authorities  need  not  take  on  the  task  of  policing  child  labor,  they may  and 
should be concerned about whether such practices arise from the structure of the market. 




as  being  necessary  to  any  kind  of  judicial  function.  Whereas  “harm  to  democracy”  can 
perhaps be described as being perhaps  too nebulous a quantity  for  judges  to work with, 
human  rights,  even  socio‐economic  ones,  are  not.  The  ever‐growing  corpus  of  socio‐
economic  rights  jurisprudence  attests  to  this. Moreover,  an  assessment  of  human  rights 
implications will not produce  rigid, per se  axioms such as  those supposedly derived  from 
ordoliberal  antitrust  theory.  Whereas  the  content  and  meaning  of  the  right  to  food  is 
necessarily  constant  and  therefore  path  dependent,  the  rules  regarding market  conduct 
can be as fluid as the “ongoing” competitive process. For instance, off‐market contracting 
need  not  be  automatically  judged  illegal  if,  as  is  indeed  the  case,153  it  does  not  deprive 
individuals  of  the  right  to  food.  As  for  the  enforcement  of  such  human  rights‐inspired 
competition  rules,  it  is  clear  that  individual  impoverished smallholders may not have  the 
wherewithal  to  bring  suit.  But,  for  that  matter,  neither  do  most  individual  consumers. 
Public competition commissions generally  fill  this role on their behalf. There  is no reason 
why human  rights  protection may not  be  carried  out  adequately  by  public  antitrust  and 
competition enforcement institutions, even the FTC, DoJ, or the European Commission. 
 
Moreover  a  total  split  between  departmental  responsibility  for  competition  control  and 
human  rights  protection  would  lead  in  practice  to  problems  of  vertical  incoherence 
                                            
153  Individual  agricultural  contracts  can  indeed be pro‐competitive  and advance human  rights  simultaneously  if 
the  buyer  makes  available  to  smallholders  credit  facilities  to  be  used  for  buying  equipment,  fertiliser,  etc; 
technical  advice,  and other equitable  conditions,  such as predetermined prices, minimum  income,  and penalty 
clauses for default by buyers: De Schutter, Agribusiness Report, supra, note 24, 17. Essentially, the buyer is paying 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between different ministries not unlike  that  faced by  the  Indian Supreme Court  in PUCL. 
John  Ruggie’s  business  and  human  rights  framework  rejects  for  these  reasons  such  a 
“narrow approach to managing the business and human rights agenda”, under which many 
governments  place  the  related  issues  of  competition  and  regulation  into  separate 




through  positive  legislation  the  liabilities  and  responsibilities  persons  should  bear  with 
respect to one another, which derive out of their respective human rights.155 There is much 
to  recommend  this view,  in  that persons both natural and  legal,  should be able  to know 
with  sufficient  certainty  what  they  may  or  may  not  do  to  other  persons.  Moreover,  it 
perhaps provides to some extent the “clear rules” Professor Svetiev calls for. However, the 
quality  of  clarity  can  be  exaggerated.  Tushnet  asks  us  to  consider  a  consumer  fraud 
litigation where a purchaser paid  for a car, but  it  transpired that  the  item had no engine 
when  it  was  delivered.  Or,  that  it  traveled  two  blocks  before  falling  apart. We  need  to 
consider,  “did  the  vendor  comply  with  his  obligation  to  supply  a  car?”156  Private  law 
obligations are not  immune  to  the necessity of  interpretation, and courts  in  jurisdictions 
adhering  to  the  public/private  distinction  often  refer  to  constitutional  or  human  rights 
principles as sources of  inspiration  in carrying out  this  task.157  Indeed, competition  law  is 
unusually  suited  to  this  method  of  “conform‐interpretation”  given  that  the  legislative 
provisions are necessarily phrased in exceptionally broad and vague terms. Indeed, in the 
case of EU  law, even  the more  specific  regulations  require  interpretive guidelines by  the 





there may be positive obligations  inherent  in  an effective  respect  for private or  family  life…. These obligations 
may  involve  the  adoption  of  measures  designed  to  secure  respect  for  private  life  even  in  the  sphere  of  the 
relations of individuals between themselves (…) the protection afforded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing 








Delivery Ltd.  [1986] 2 SCR 573 (McIntyre  J.)  (holding that while  the rights contained  in  the Canadian Charter of 
Fundamental  Rights  and  Freedoms  would  not  invalidate  rules  of  judge‐made  common  law  at  issue  in  private 
litigation,  courts  ought  nevertheless  to  apply  and  develop  the  principles  of  the  common  law  in  a  manner 
consistent with Charter values). 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European Commission,158 and there is every reason to refer to human rights norms in this 
interpretive  task.  A  recent  opinion  issued  by  Advocate  General  Sharpston  before  the 
European Court of Justice points logically to this end: 
 
“The  Court  has  held  that  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)  is one of the international  instruments for the 
protection of  human  rights of which  it  takes  account  in  applying  the 
general  principles  of  Community  law.  It  seems  to me  that  the  same 






Of  course,  there  are  a  number  of  inadequacies  in  the  “conform‐interpretation”  model. 
First,  the  interface  of  consumer  welfare  and  the  right  to  food  may  not  be  perfect.  For 
example, we may imagine a situation where abusive buyer practices completely extirpate 
the  farming  of  a  certain  crop  in  a  certain  area,  but  the  buyer  is  able  to  replace  the  lost 
source of supply with an alternative which, at any rate, costs the consumer no more than 
did the old source, and  in all other material qualities  is exactly  the same. The producers’ 
right  to  food may  have  been  violated,  but  it  simply  cannot  be  said  that  consumers  are 
adversely  affected  to  an  appreciable  extent,  even  factoring  in  lower  thresholds  of 
presumption as a result of conform‐interpretation with the right to food. The limitations of 
conform‐interpretation should become particularly evident in the following section on the 
“extraterritorial  reach.”  There will  also be  limits  to  the ability of  judges  and  competition 
authorities  to  conform‐interpret  the  facts  to  achieve  at  a  result  that  favors  the  right  to 
food,  and  any  attempt  to  go  beyond  this  will  be  unseemly.  Secondly,  and  more 
fundamentally,  the  right  to  food  should  be  valuable  for  its  own  sake,  rather  than  as  a 
means to the end of consumer protection. Kant’s second categorical imperative is not just 
a philosophical  jaunt devoid of practical  consequence –  “dignity”  is  now  recognized as  a 
legal concept in numerous international and constitutional instruments.160 The solution of 
                                            
158  See,  Philip Marsden &  Simon Bishop, Editorial:  Intellectual  Leaders  Still  Need Ground  to  Stand On,  3.2  EUR. 






South Africa 1996:  (“The Republic of South Africa  is one, sovereign, democratic state  founded on the  following 
values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms…”); 
Art.  1,  European  Charter  of  Fundamental  Freedoms:  (“Human  dignity  is  inviolable.  It  must  be  respected  and 
protected.”) 




Certainly,  it  is  beyond  debate  that  competition  authorities  may  not  positively  violate 
human rights by,  say, conducting unauthorized dawn raids  into offices and the homes of 
company  executives,161  or  issuing  unduly  vague  summonses  or  orders.162  However, 
competition  authorities,  as  organs  of  the  State  are  also  required,  under  the  duty  to 
protect, to constrain private corporate conduct that results in the deprivation of the rights 
of others. As usual,  South Africa, whose  constitution provides both  for  the protection of 
the  right  to  food163 and  for  the horizontal application of constitutional  rights,164 provides 
the most  fertile ground  for  this argument.  For example,  the South African Human Rights 
Commission  (SAHRC),  in  submissions  to  the  South  African  Competition  Tribunal  in 
proceedings  against  a  bread manufacturer who  had  participated  in  a  cartel  and  a  drugs 










and,  consequently,  those  systems  provide,  albeit  in  different  forms,  protection  against  arbitrary  or 
disproportionate intervention.”. 






164 Section 8(1) of  the South African Bill of Rights: providing  that private persons may be  fixed with obligations 
under  the Bill  of  Rights  “if,  and  to  the  extent  that,  it  is  applicable,  taking  into  account  the  nature  of  any  duty 
imposed by the right.” 
165  South  African  Human  Rights  Commission,  Submission  to  the  Competition  Commission  South  Africa  in  the 
Matter of the Competition Commission, Tiger Brands Limited and Adcock Ingram Critical Care (Pty) Ltd, Case no. 
15/CR/Feb07.  The  bread  manufacturer,  Tiger  Brands  subsequently  settled  with  the  Commission,  but  another 
member of  the  cartel,  Pioneer  Foods, was  found  liable  and  fined 195 million  rand: Competition Commission  v. 
Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd., Case nos. (15/CR/Feb07) (50/CR/May08), reasons  issued (3 Feb 2010).  I am grateful to 
Dr. Christine Jesseman for providing me these references. 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F. Extraterritorial Reach 
 
Modern  food  supply  chains  are  truly  global,  cutting  across  countless  state  and  national 
boundaries. It is not uncommon for salmon to be fished off the coast of Alaska, brought to 
China  for  filleting,  and  transported  back  to  California  for  sale  to  end  consumers.166  The 
extraordinary amount of concentration at certain strategic points along food supply chains 
only  serves  to  emphasize  the  level  of  interconnectedness  between  consumers  and 
producers scattered across different parts of the world. As such, some reconsideration of 







in  the  US  and  the  EU  on  the  subject  of  extraterritorial  competition  law  jurisdiction.  US 
Courts established very early on that they had the jurisdiction to control conduct outside 
US  borders  but  which  nonetheless  created  effects  within  it.  In  the  celebrated  Alcoa 
decision,  Judge  Leaned  Hand  held  that  it  “is  settled  law…  that  any  State  may  impose 
liabilities,  even  upon  persons  not  within  its  allegiance,  for  conduct  outside  its  borders 
which  has  consequences  within  its  borders  which  the  State  reprehends;  and  these 
liabilities  other  States  will  ordinarily  recognize.”167  However,  subsequent  legislative  and 
judicial developments effectively limited the scope of such jurisdiction. These included § 6a 
of  the  Foreign  Trade  Antitrust  Amendment  Act  (FTAIA)  of  1982,  which  provided  that 
territorial jurisdiction could be established only where extraterritorial conduct had “direct, 
substantial and  reasonably  foreseeable effect” on  trade or  commerce  in  the US, and  the 
judgment  in  Hartford  Fire  Insurance,168  limiting  antitrust  control  to  conduct  that  “was 
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States”. 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corporation upon Hazera, a foreign supplier‐developer of tomato seeds, preventing it from 
supplying  any  other  buyer  in  the  U.S.  The  U.S.  argued,  amongst  other  things,  that  the 
clause  “makes  less  likely  possible  innovations  from  Hazera  in  the  creation  of  heartier 
tomato  seeds  ‘that  will  allow  consumers  to  enjoy  higher  quality,  better  tasting  winter 




Clearly,  this  line  of  reasoning  renders  impossible  control  over  conduct  of  dominant 





In contrast, one may consider  the practice of  the European Court of  Justice  in  the Wood 
Pulp171  case,  where  it  established  objective  territorial  jurisdiction  on  the  basis  that  a 
concerted  practice  between  several  non‐EU  undertakings  begun  outside  of  the  EU  had 
been  implemented  in  it.  Another  example  of  the  EU’s  more  expansive  approach  to 
assertion of jurisdiction is Gencor v. Lonrho,172 where the Court held that application of the 
EU’s  merger  laws  to  two  South  African  mining  companies  was  “justified  under  public 
international  law  when  it  is  foreseeable  that  a  proposed  concentration  will  have  an 
immediate  and  substantial  effect  in  the  (Union)”.  The  court  however  interpreted  the 
criterion of “immediacy” to pertain not so much to economic effects, but to the structure 
of  the  market:  “the  concentration  would  have  had  the  direct  and  immediate  effect  of 
creating  the  conditions  in  which  abuses  were  not  only  possible  but  economically 
rational”.173 As for the criterion of substantiality, it was not necessary for the “substantial” 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Alcoa  “effects” doctrine  in  its  full  strength.175  Certainly,  there  is  the  concern of  principle 
that  “an  unlimited  acceptance  of  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  based  on  economic  effects 
could  clearly  lead  to  extensive  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  States.”176 
However,  this  principle  of  EU  competition  law  has  over  time  gained  widespread 








Oddly,  a  number  of  factors  indicate  that  a  human  rights‐inspired  competition  law might 
have less extraterritorial applicability than a consumerist competition law. This arises as a 
result of  the state‐centric paradigm that governs contemporary human rights protection. 
As  Narula  notes,  the  ICESCR  is  unique  among  international  human  rights  treaties  in  not 
stipulating a  jurisdiction clause.177 Nevertheless,  the ESR Committee  in General Comment 
No.  12  defined  the  jurisdictional  scope  of  the  right  to  adequate  food  by  stipulating  that 
“(e)very  State  is  obliged  to  ensure  for  everyone  under  its  jurisdiction  access  to  the 
minimum  essential  food  which  is  sufficient,  nutritionally  adequate  and  safe,  to  ensure 
freedom  from  hunger.”178  Also  declarative  of  the  relevant  general  doctrines  are  the 
Maastricht  Guidelines  on  Violations  of  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights, which  state 
                                            
175  Olivier  De  Schutter,  Extraterritorial  Jurisdiction  as  a  tool  for  improving  the  Human  Rights  Accountability  of 
Transnational  Corporations,  Background  Paper  for  Seminar  organised  in  collaboration  with  UN  High 
Commissioner  for Human Rights, Brussels, 23,  (note 93)  (2006) and Andreas Löwenfeld,  International Litigation 
and the Quest  for Reasonableness, 33‐41  (1996); Derek W. Bowett,  Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority 
over Activities and Resources, 7 (1982). Moreover, De Schutter notes that “In their joint separate opinion to the 
judgment of 14 February 2002 delivered by the  International Court of Justice  in the Case concerning the Arrest 
Warrant  of  11  April  2000  (Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  v.  Belgium),  Judges  Higgins,  Kooijmans,  and 
Buergenthal seem to share this reading of developments in European Union law.” 









General  Comment  No.  8:    The  relationship  between  economic  sanctions  and  respect  for  economic,  social  and 
cultural  rights,  17th Sess., para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8  (1997); U.N. CESCR, General Comment No. 9: The 
domestic application of the Covenant, 19th Sess., para. 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998). 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that  responsibility  for  violations  of  ICESCR  rights  is  imputable  to  the  state within whose 
jurisdiction they occur.179 (The Maastricht Guidelines consist of the agreed opinions of the 
International  Commission  of  Jurists,  and  therefore  have  no  legal  binding  force. 
Nevertheless, they are an influential reference point with regards to the ICESCR). 
 
To wit,  the  concept  of  jurisdiction  is  not  restricted  to  the  national  territory  of  the  state 
concerned,  but  extends  to  foreign  territory  over  which  the  state  exercises  “effective 
control”.180  The  concept  of  “effective  control  places  two  different  stumbling  blocks 
preventing  the  assertion  of  competition  controls  for  the  benefit  of  the  right  to  food  of 
foreign persons situated overseas. The first is the fact that the sort of influence a state may 
have  over  foreign  persons  through  its  competition  law  simply  does  not  amount  to 
“effective control.” In Bankovic v. Belgium, the European Court of Human Rights found that 
Belgium, as a participant  in  the NATO coalition that bombed Belgrade during  the Kosovo 
crisis,  was  not  responsible  for  the  deaths  that  occurred  as  a  result  of  the  mistaken 
targeting of  the Radio‐Television Serbia  tower, on  the basis  that  the NATO members did 
not  exercise  “effective  control”  over  the  territory.  The  Yugoslav  government  was  the 
sovereign entity exercising such effective control at all material  times. Likewise,  it  simply 
cannot be said that the governments of the States in whose territory the anti‐competitive 
conduct  occurs  ever  relinquished  or  lost  effective  control  over  that  territory.  A  second 
stumbling block may lie in what appears to be a downplaying of the importance of socio‐
economic  rights  as  compared  to  civil  and  political  rights.  In  its  advisory  opinion  on  the 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the 
International Court of Justice explained the lack of a jurisdictional stipulation in the ICESCR 
as  arising  from  “the  fact  that  this  Covenant  guarantees  rights  which  are  essentially 
territorial.”181  As  De  Schutter  notes,  this  “assertion  is  made  without  any  justification 
grounded either on the text of the Covenant or on the preparatory works.”182 One could go 
further, and say that the ICJ got it exactly wrong: as almost all the discussion in this paper 
demonstrates,  “territoriality”  is  the  one  thing  that  does  not  characterize  contemporary 
global  food  supply  chains  and  their  implications  for  the  right  to  food.  It  is  therefore 
suggested that that case can provide only very little guidance on the right to food, because 
although  it  specifically  raised  the  issue of  the  impact of  Israel’s  building a wall  upon  the 
                                            
179 U.N. ESOCOR, Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc 
E/C.12/2000/13, para. 16 (2000). 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right to food of Palestinians, it declined to elaborate upon the positive duties Israel would 
have regarding their vindication, or of the vindication of their social and economic rights in 
general.183  Instead,  the most  charitable  construction we  can  put  on  the  case  is  that  the 
court limited itself to Israel’s negative obligations.184 
 
As  such,  in  the  absence of  any  other  jurisdictional  hook,  the  efficacy  of  a  human  rights‐
based  competition  law  would  be  limited  to  purely  intra‐national  or  intra‐regional  food 
supply chains. To  reiterate, modern  food supply chains are global. Moreover,  in many of 
the countries where the majority of smallholders producing for those chains live, the state 
of  competition  control  leaves  much  to  be  desired.  First,  competition  control  requires 
“extraordinarily  sophisticated  domestic  institutions  (Competition  Authorities),  backed  by 
legislation, jurisdiction and quasi‐judicial independence,”185 which may be costly for some 
developing  countries.186  Second,  there  may  not  be  the  political  will  on  the  part  of 
developing  countries  to  challenge  the  dominance  of  the  largest  actors  controlling 
international agricultural markets. This is compounded by the fact that there are at present 
around  2,500  Bilateral  Investment  Treaties  (BITs)  allowing  investors  to  take  States  to 
binding international arbitration for changes in domestic law that result in losses to them, 
where such national  legislation was  intended to advance social and environmental goals. 
Such  BITs  routinely  include  “economic  stabilization”  provisions,  and/or  deem  regulatory 
takings  as  de  facto  expropriations  of  investor  property.187  These  clauses  have  profound 
chilling  effects  on  states  wishing  to  embark  on  any  programme  of  socially  progressive 





community  and  do  in  fact  have  the means  of  legal  control  over  the  conduct  abroad  of 
multinational corporations.”189 
                                            
183 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, para. 112. 
184 Narula, supra, note 34, 734. 
185  Markus  W.  Gehring,  Sustainable  Competition  Law,  Conference  Paper  for  the  2003  Fifth  Session  of  the 
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation, 2 (Cancun, Sept. 10‐14, 2003). 
186  Taimoon  Stewart,  Julian  Clarke  and  Susan  Joekes, Competition  Law  in  Action:  Experiences  from Developing 
Countries, International Development and Research Centre, 26–41 (2007). 
187  Ruggie,  supra,  note 46,  at  5.  Prof.  Ruggie provides by way of  example  a  recent  instance where  a  European 
mining company challenged South African  laws meant to advance the economic standing of black citizens. See, 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has  held  it  would  be  “unconscionable”  to  interpret  responsibility  under  human  rights 
instruments  as  to  “permit  a  State  Party  to  perpetrate  violations  […]  on  the  territory  of 
another State, which violations  it could not perpetrate on  its own territory.”191 Certainly, 
the  same  objections  can  be  rehearsed  that  these  pronouncements  apply  to  civil  and 
political rights, rather than to socio‐economic rights, etc, etc, and the same rejoinders can 
be made  to  those  objections.  However,  I  would  like  to  consider  the  implications  of  not 
extending  the above principles  to  the  right  to  food, and  to  the competition  regimes  that 
must be interpreted by their light. If the duty to protect human rights is to be limited to the 
State’s  territory,  then  there will  have  to be  two  sets of  competition  law: a human  rights 
compliant one for one’s own nationals, and a human rights non‐compliant one wherever 
producers  are  located  overseas.  Apart  from  adding  to  the  already  considerable 
consternation  of  the  students  of  the  subject,  officials  and  diplomats  will  be  pressed  to 
explain  why  there  are,  in  effect,  two  bodies  of  competition  law,  of  which  one  permits 
violations of  the human rights of  the  individuals  it affects.  It  is one  thing  to deny certain 










191  HRC, Delia  Saldias  de  Lopez  Burgos  v  Uruguay,  Comm.  No.  52/1979,  paras.  12.1‐12.3  (29  July  1981);  Lilian 
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 56/1979, para 10.3 (29 July 1981). The ECtHR, on the basis of the 
HRC pronouncements, has concluded  that:  “Article 1 of  the Convention cannot be  interpreted so as  to allow a 
State  party  to  perpetrate  violations  of  the  Convention  on  the  territory  of  another  State,  which  it  could  not 
perpetrate on  its  own  territory”  in  Issa a.  o.  v.  Turkey,  Appl. No.  31821/96,  para.  71  (16 November 2004)  and 
Isaak  v.  Turkey  (Dec.),  Appl.  No.  44587/98,  para.  19  (28  September  2006)  and  Solomou  v.  Turkey,  Appl.  No. 
36832/97, para. 45 (24 June 2008) and Andreou v. Turkey (Dec.), Appl. No. 45653/99, 10 (03 June 2008) and Al‐
Saadoon  and Mufdhi  v.  United  Kingdom  (Dec.),  Appl.  No.  61490/08,  para.  85  (30  June  2009).  I  am  grateful  to 
Violeta Moreno‐Lax for these references. 




of  human  rights‐based  competition  laws  to  the  developing  states where  the majority  of 
impoverished small farmers live. Article 2(1) ICESCR requires States to implement the right 
to  food  and  all  other  rights  contained  in  the  Covenant  "individually  and  through 
international  assistance  and  cooperation."192  This  precise  language  is  repeated  in  Article 
11(2)  ICESCR  concerning  the  measures  to  be  taken  by  States  Parties,  and  Article  11(1) 
ICESCR  provides  that  “States  Parties  will  take  appropriate  measures  to  ensure  the 
realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
co‐operation  and  comply  with  their  commitment  to  take  joint  and  separate  action  to 
achieve  the  full  realization  of  the  right  to  food.”  Additionally,  the  Committee  has  noted 
that  the  obligation  of  international  cooperation  “is  particularly  incumbent  upon  those 
States which are in a position to assist others in this regard.”193 
 
Accordingly,  there may  be  a  legal  obligation  for  developed  states  to  offer  assistance  to 
developing  ones  to  defray  the  costs  of  maintaining  and  staffing  credible  competition 
authorities,  and  for  developing  countries  to  accept  such  assistance.  Such  assistance may 
come  from  the United Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and Development  (UNCTAD) which 
offers  technical  training  courses  on  competition  law  and  policy  to  judges,  enforcement‐
officials  and  other  decision‐makers  from  developing  countries  with  respect  to  adopting, 
maintaining  and  improving  national  competition  law  systems.194  Other  methods  of 
advancing  growth  of  competition  law  in  developing  countries  would  be  to  adopt 
International Cooperation Agreements by which States parties agree  to assist each other 
with  respect  to producing and exchanging documentary evidence, and even  to apply  the 
other country’s competition laws where appropriate.195 
 
Although  international  cooperation  is  phrased  as  a  legal  obligation,  it  suffers  from  an 
indeterminacy  of  the  extent  and  scope  of  the  obligation,  let  alone ways  of  enforcing  it. 
Essentially,  it  is  an  attempt  to  impose  some  legal  order  over  the  dark  lawless  tracts  of 
foreign policy, where diplomats habitually  “trade  in State prestige and advantage, not  in 






the  UN.  See,  also  the  UNCTAD  website  on  training  courses  offered  in  Geneva  or  by  correspondence: 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4116&lang=1 (Last Accessed : 23 November 2010). 
195 See,  the Closer Economic Relations Agreement, entered  into  force between Australia and New Zealand on 1 
January 1983. 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justice.”196  However,  the  argument  has  been  made  that  the  obligation  of  international 
cooperation  is  part  of  an  emerging  recognition  of  states’  “duty  to  fulfill”  the  rights  of 
persons  who  are  neither  citizens  nor  within  its  jurisdiction,197and  this  can  be  situated 
within  the  emerging  awareness  of  how human  rights  have  significance  even outside  the 
state‐centric  paradigm.  Put  simply,  the  previously  vague  and  nebulous  obligation  of 




“International  cooperation  requires  States  parties  to  refrain  from 
actions that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the 
right to water in other countries. Any activities undertaken within the 









be positively  alarmed at  the necessary  implication  that non‐nationals may demand as of 
right that one’s State implement certain measures to ensure physical and financial access 
to  a  minimum  adequate  level  of  food  in  other  countries.  It  may  be  objected,  that 
notwithstanding  any  moral  duties,  States  cannot  justifiably  be  held  to  any  such  legal 
obligations  regarding  the  right  to  food  to  individual  non‐nationals  outside  their 




The  response  to  this  objection will  have  to be brief  and  impressionistic:  this  small  essay 
cannot  begin  to  expound  a  legal,  moral,  and/or  political  theory  on  the  subject  of  what 
obligations  States  owe  to  outsiders  given  that  it  has  been  treated  by  figures  no  less 
illustrious  than  Kant  and  Rawls,199  whose  works  are  by  no means  the  last  word  on  the 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subject. We may begin by asking why it is important to protect human rights at all purely 
within  the  territorial  confines  of  the  State.  If  we  disregard  communitarian  and  popular 




moral  authority  over  its  subjects.  A  failure  to  show  such  respect  releases  those  subjects 
from any bond or obligation of  loyalty;  for  instance, “the apartheid government of South 
Africa  had  no  legitimate  authority  over  blacks.”200  This  is  generally  what  is  meant  by 
assertions that all men are created equal, that they are endowed with certain inalienable 
rights, that the sole end of government is to secure these rights, and that whenever “any 
Form of Government becomes destructive of  these ends,  it  is  the Right of  the People  to 
alter or abolish it....”201 
 
These are not  simply political or philosophical  speculations, but often  legal ones as well, 
since  adjudication  is  required  in  order  to  ascertain  which  kinds  of  disrespect  entitle 





officials  of  the  former  right‐wing  government.  It  was  argued  that  the  amnesty  was 
incompatible  with  Brazilian  constitutional  protections  against  torture,  and  that 
investigations should therefore be resumed. Proponents of the amnesty law argued that if 
proceedings were brought against former officials, similar ones would have to be instituted 
against  former  left‐wing  insurrectionists  as well.  In  rebuttal,  it  was  argued  that  no  such 
proceedings  could  be  brought  because  their  resistance  was  against  an  illegitimate 
government. 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However,  these  theories of political  legitimacy pertain only  to  the  “sovereign people,”203 
and leave unanswered the question of those people from whom the State does not extract 
allegiance. Why should a State not be  free  to mistreat outsiders, as a matter of  law,  if  it 
does not obtain any benefit or forbearance from those outsiders in return? One could say 
that  a  State  that  mistreats  outsiders  invites  sanctions  from  other  States,  but  this  is  an 
argument of reciprocity and self‐interest rather than a normative one of law or morality.204 
At  any  rate,  this  option  is  not  available  as  regards  a  State  too  militarily  or  financially 
powerful  to be  sanctioned effectively. Are we  then  to  say  that  States owe absolutely no 







bases,  or  to  allow  planes  to  carrying  individuals  for  extraordinary  renditions  to  land  on 
one’s  territory,  even  though  the  torture will  be  carried  out  by  others  in  faraway  places. 
Such  conduct  not  only  provides  outsiders with  a  dispensation  to  interfere  or  undermine 
the  concerned  political  system,  but  also  provides  the  citizens  of  that  political  system  a 
reason  to  disrespect  its  directives.  If  one  accepts  this  premise,  it  becomes  possible  to 
accept, as  legal  in character,  the pronouncements of  the ESR Committee purporting  that 





to  food  are  simply  different  from  civil  and  political  rights  such  as  the  right  not  to  be 
tortured. The only additional comment to be made outside what has already been said in 
Part C, Section III of this paper is to consider the effect of a denial of the right to food upon 
the  legitimacy  of  State.  To  the  contention  that  subversion  from within  and  interference 
from without may be justifiable in the case of widespread torture or genocide, but that it 
cannot be  justifiable as against a State  that  simply  fails  to distribute  its  food properly,206 
one may point to histories of famine such as Mark Davis’ Late Victorian Holocausts, which 
                                            
203  Allen  Buchanan  &  Robert  Keohane,  The  Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance  Institutions,  20(4)  ETHICS  AND  INT. 
AFFAIRS 405, 416 (2006). 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leave  one with  the  strong  suspicion  that  the  vast majority  of mutinies  and  insurrections 




 With  respect  to  the  extraterritorial  application  of  socio‐economic  rights,  a  much  more 
knotty problem  is  raised by  the concept of equality. Rawls  famously noted as one of  the 
limbs of his Theory of Justice that the priority had to be given to liberty, because equality is 
a political value that is shared only to those within one’s own political community, and at 
that,  only  in  public  life.207  For  instance,  we  do  not  generally  give  non‐citizens  a  vote  in 
public  elections.208  We  even  make  leeway  for  despicable  kinds  of  discrimination  in  this 






Of  course,  one  solution  would  be  to  bring  the  entire  world  under  one  sovereign 
government, but this is indeed utopian, and in the bad sense. More modest goals such as 
the  development  of  a  world  antitrust  authority  have  met  with  failure.  There  was  an 
attempt  to  create an  international  competition  court  in  the Havana Charter 1948, which 
served as the foundation for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Chapter 
V of the Charter dealt with restrictive business practices, and also required State parties to 
regulate  anticompetitive  activities  of  an  international  nature.211  However,  because  of 
ratification difficulties in the US, Chapter V was left out of the GATT. On the other hand, it 
has  proved  impossible  to  separate  competition  issues  from  trade  matters212  and 
accordingly, the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition 









211  Article  46(1),  Havana  Charter,  available  at:  http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf  (Last 
Accessed: 23 November 2010).  
212  Robert  D. 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& 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Policy (WGTCP), formed at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996 has been active in 
formulating  a  “multilateral  framework  on  competition  policy.”213  These  developments  at 
the WTO however, appear to address the competitive problem of cartelisation rather than 





as  Sen  puts  it,  that  “if  one  is  in  a  position  to  do  something  effective  in  preventing  the 
violation of [human rights], then one does have a good reason to do  just that – a reason 
that must be  taken  into account  in deciding what  should be done.  It  is  still possible  that 




children  are  as  well‐fed,  clothed  and  educated  as  your  own:  one may  legitimately  care 
more for one’s own.  
 
Instead,  the  solution  to  Nagel’s  query  may  very  well  be  to  proceed  from  this  premise. 
When  then  do  you  actually  come  under  an  obligation  to  do  something  about  the 
neighbor’s children? Two  instances come to mind. The first  is when those children are  in 
such a perilous condition, and you are so relatively well‐off that it would not harm you in 
the least to help them. You disgrace yourself when, ensconced in silken cushions on your 
verandah, you see  the child  starving  to death outside and do nothing. This humanitarian 
duty corresponds,  roughly  to  the aspect of  the  right  to  food described as  the  right  to be 
free  from  hunger.  The  second  is  when  the  condition  of  those  children  is  the  result  of 
something you have done to them. If you have burned down their house, it is your moral 
duty,  to  compensate  them, or, at  the bare minimum,  to desist  from doing  it  again.  Such 
assistance  as  you may  give,  is  not  charity,  but  a moral  obligation.  This  obligation, which 




duties  to one’s neighbour, presumes that we do not  live  in a Hobbesian State of Nature. 
Instead, it presupposes an established legal order, which turns norms of moral reason into 
                                            
213 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214 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& Frédéric Jenny, Competition Policy, Economic Development and the Possible 
Role  of  a Multi‐lateral  Framework on Competition Policy:  Insights  from  the WTO Working Group on  Trade and 
Competition Policy, in ERLINDA MEDALLA 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AMARTYA 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373 (2009). 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legal  ones  by  means  of  legislative  and  compulsory  judicial  institutions,  as  well  as  its 
monopoly  on  the  use  of  force.  Public  international  law  in  general,  and  the  international 
human  rights  regime  in  particular,  it  is  then  argued,  do  not  possess  these  features.  This 
brings  us  back  into  the  age‐old  debate  about  whether  international  law  really  is  law.  I 
cannot examine here the arguments that have been made for and against this contention 








The central premise of  this essay has been that competition  law must  find a way to take 
account of the international human right to food, either through conform‐interpretation or 
by directly incorporating the protection of a minimum level of producer welfare consistent 
with  the  right  to  food  into  the  purposes  of  competition  laws,  modifications  of 
appreciability rules, of international law doctrines such as extraterritorial  jurisdiction, and 
of the roles and competences of national competition regulators. Throughout this article, I 
have  described  the  fundamental  obligation  arising  from  the  right  to  food  as  being  an 
obligation  that  all  persons  have  physical  and  economic  access  to  a  minimum  adequate 
amount  of  nutrition  that  is  nutritious,  free  from  adverse  substances,  and  culturally 
acceptable.  By  doing  so,  I  do  not mean  to  deny  that  the  impoverished  and  hungry may 
have a claim in justice to something more than just the bare minimum. It is possible that by 
reworking  the  structure of global  food  supply  chains  to allow  for greater participation  in 
decision‐making  processes,  currently  impoverished  smallholders  in  the  developing world 
may  enjoy  a  living  standard  somewhat  closer  to  that  of  the  consumers  they  ultimately 
service.  This  essay  seeks merely  to be  a  first  step  in  a wider  conversation  about how  to 
achieve to these greater ends. 
 
Nor  should  this  essay,  in  its  promotion  of  a  corporate  duty  to  protect,  be  read  as  a 
contribution  to  the  communitarian  “responsibilities”  movement216  that  postulates 
variously,  that  human  rights  must  be  balanced  with  responsibilities  in  order  to  avoid  a 
descent  into  supposedly  destructive  forms  of  individualism;  or  that  a  failure  to  give 
responsibilities  the  same  importance  as  human  rights  leads  to  social  and  moral  decay 
supposedly  characteristic  of  modern  societies.  The  notion  of  responsibility  or  duty 
contained  in  this  article  pertains  to  a  moral  obligation  to  compensate  those  who  are 
harmed as a consequence of one’s actions. 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restraints  on  officials  dealing  with  the  problems  of  the  twentieth 
century, is one to disturb self‐confidence. These principles grew in soil 
which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of 
society,  that  his  liberty  was  attainable  through  mere  absence  of 
governmental  restraints,  and  that  government  should  be  entrusted 
with few controls, and only the mildest supervision over men's affairs. 
We  must  transplant  these  rights  to  a  soil  in  which  the  laissez‐faire 
concept  or  principle  of  noninterference  has  withered,  at  least  as  to 
economic  affairs,  and  social  advancements  are  increasingly  sought 
through  closer  integration  of  society  and  through  expanded  and 
strengthened governmental controls. These changed conditions often 
deprive  precedents  of  reliability,  and  cast  us  more  than  we  would 
choose upon our own  judgment. But we act  in  these matters not by 
authority  of  our  competence,  but  by  force  of  our  commissions. We 
cannot,  because  of  modest  estimates  of  our  competence  in  such 
specialties  as  public  education,  withhold  the  judgment  that  history 





demands  of  the  right  to  food.  However,  the  difficulty  of  this  task  should  not  be 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